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Jihad

The Word They Use to Scare You

How the West manufactured the "holy warrior" it taught you to fear

Fireline Press — Faith and Power · Politics of Islam in the West Series — Part III

YOU HAVE WATCHED the word do its work. A bombing somewhere, a name in the news, a face on a screen — and then the word, dropped like a gavel. Jihad. One syllable more than the sentence needs, and the case is closed on nearly two billion people. Holy war. A faith at war with you by its nature, commanded to fight until you submit or die. You were not asked to weigh anything. You were handed a verdict.

Whoever handed it to you has read the word but never studied it. They can throw a verse number at you — they got it from a meme, a book, a website, anywhere but the Qur'an itself — yet they have likely never read the verse in context, and could not tell you when it was revealed, why, or a single condition the faith places on it. They do not know that the same word they spit as "holy war" is the word the faith gives a believer struggling against their own greed and cowardice. Their interpretation of the word does its work whether they understand it or not.

But the ones who taught it to them understand it perfectly. The influencer feeding a following, the YouTuber growing a subscriber base, the preacher raising a congregation on a shared enemy, the propagandist who needs a civilisational threat for political gain — none of them is confused about jihad. They know what it means and misrepresent it on purpose, because the fear pays and the truth does not. The word is not there to inform you. It is there to shut your mind before you open it — to make a Muslim's faith the evidence against them before they have said a word in their defence.

Pick the word up and read it for yourself. It does not say what they told you.

Jihad does not mean war. War has its own words in Arabic, and the faith calls none of them holy. Jihad means struggle — the effort a person makes toward what is right, against the easier thing. And the highest form of it, the Prophet said, is not a blade raised against an enemy. It is a sentence spoken to a tyrant. A word of justice, said to the face of a ruler with the power to kill you for saying it.¹ In the faith they have taught you to fear, the greatest struggle a believer can wage is a word mightier than the sword.

That is the thing they cannot afford you to learn. Because the moment you know what the word means, you start to ask who taught you the other thing — who built the monster, who armed it, who collects on the fear of it now. The word does not convict the Muslim in front of you. Read to the end, and the charge lands on the ones who put it in your mouth.

Here is the word. Here is who it belongs to. And here is who has been renting it out.


A Pope's Word, Not a Prophet's

Ask where the phrase came from. Not the bombing, not the headline — the words "holy war" themselves. You will be told they are what jihad means. They are not. They are not even Islamic. The phrase has a birthplace, and it is not Makkah. It is a frozen field in central France, and the date is the twenty-seventh of November, 1095.

That day, at Clermont, Pope Urban II stood before a crowd too large for any hall and preached a war. March east, he told them, take Jerusalem back from the Muslims, kill for the Church — and every sin you carry will be washed clean. Die on the road and you go straight to heaven, a lifetime's penance paid in a single stroke. The crowd roared back three words: "Deus vult." God wills it. Urban made them the battle cry of the Crusades.²

Look at what he did there, because it is the thing itself. He took war — killing, the oldest sin — and made it a sacrament. He blessed the sword. He offered paradise as the wage for spilling blood. That is holy war: not war a religion permits, but war a religion sanctifies — the killing itself an act of worship, the killer's soul made cleaner for the corpse at his feet. Christendom built that idea. A pope preached it. Knights carried it to Jerusalem in 1099 and, by the crusaders' own chroniclers' telling, waded through streets ankle-deep in blood, certain God was pleased.

Now try to build the same thing inside Islam. The grammar will not hold it.

In Islam the sacred belongs to God — only to God. Nothing made by hands shares in it. Muslims who say "Holy Qur'an" or "Holy Prophet" are reaching for a word that does not fit; the careful ones say "Noble," "Glorious," "Most Beloved," because to call a created thing holy is to hand it a piece of what belongs to God alone. And of everything the faith refuses to sanctify, war stands first in the line. Islam has its words for it — harb, for war; qital, for the killing — and not one of them carries a breath of the holy. The tradition treats war as close to the worst of what people do to one another, permitted only when nothing else is left, and never, on any reading, as a road to paradise. Islam has no sacrament of the sword — no rite that turns killing into worship, no 'God wills it' shouted over drawn blades. There is no indulgence for the blade. The single thing the Crusade made holy is the one thing Islam counts among the gravest.³

So when someone tells you jihad means holy war, see plainly what has happened. They have taken a doctrine their own church authored — armed pilgrimage, sin washed off in enemy blood, heaven promised to the one who kills — and fastened it onto a faith whose creed cannot even form the phrase. The sanctified war is a Christian inheritance. Its cry is Latin. Its author wore the papal tiara. And the loudest voices warning you that Islam is holy war are the cultural descendants of the men who made war a sacrament and called it the will of God.

They are not describing the Qur'an. They are describing their own history, and charging Islam with it.

Which leaves the question they never let stand where it belongs. If "holy war" is their phrase and not the Prophet's, then it is worth seeing the full reach of the word they flattened into a single blade.


The Struggle They Never Mention

Start with the root, because the root gives the game away. Jihad comes from a verb that means to strive, to exert, to struggle toward something worth the effort. It is not built from the word for war (harb). It is not built from the word for killing (qital). It is the word a Muslim reaches for whenever the right thing is the hard thing and they do it anyway.

The Qur'an shows how wide it runs, and it shows it in the one place the fearmongers will never take you: Makkah, in the earliest years, when the Muslims had no army, no state, no sword to raise and no permission to raise one. Fighting had not yet entered the word at all. There, under persecution, God commanded a jihad — and named the weapon. "Strive against them with it," the verse says, "a great striving" — and the "it" is the Qur'an. The recited word. The argument. This is the first jihad in Islam, revealed in the Makkan years before armed struggle was permitted: a hunted people preaching the truth to the power crushing them, and God called it "great." That is no footnote to the meaning of jihad. It is the root of it — the sense the word carried before the sword was ever lawful.

And the Prophet named the same thing its highest form. Asked which jihad was best, he did not point to a battlefield. He pointed to a word of justice spoken to a tyrant — to the face of a ruler who could kill you for saying it. The first jihad the Qur'an commanded and the greatest jihad the Prophet named are one act: the truth, said aloud, to power that does not want to hear it. Neither has a sword in it.

That is the struggle they never mention. And it does not stop there. There is the jihad of wealth — the Qur'an pairs striving with your money and striving with your life, over and over, because feeding the hungry and funding what is just is its own hard road. And there is the oldest and most private jihad of them all, the one every believer fights alone: the struggle against the self, against your own temper and greed and cowardice, the fight no one sees and no one applauds, where the only enemy is you.

This is the plain content of the word, fourteen centuries deep, sitting in the book and the sayings the accusers claim to have read.

Now — is there a jihad of the sword? Yes. There is. A people attacked has the right to defend itself, and the tradition calls that striving too. Shrink the word down to nothing but private self-improvement and you hand the frauds the win — they point to the sword and call you a liar. So here it is, plainly: the sword is in the word. It is real. It is also the narrowest strip of it — one lawful, conditional, hemmed-in form of struggle among many — and, as you are about to see, nothing like the freelance slaughter they have hung on it.

That is what they did to a word. They took one that runs from a whispered refusal of your own worst impulse all the way to the lawful defence of a people — and cut everything off it but the blade. Then they bent the blade into a shape no Islamic institution would recognise, and told you that shape was the religion.

So where did that shape come from? Not from Makkah. Not from the verse revealed to a hunted, preaching minority. The caricature you were handed — the sword, freelance, unbound by any law, aimed at you — has a birthplace and a budget, and both are far more recent than the Qur'an. It was built. And we know who built it.


The Monster They Built

Its name is Operation Cyclone.

That is not a label from a conspiracy forum. It is the CIA's own name for what became the longest and most expensive covert operation in the Agency's history — Carter's signature, Brzezinski's memos, a paper trail the United States has never seriously denied.

Read the dates, because the dates rewrite the story you were told. Carter signed the first order to back the Afghan fighters on the third of July, 1979 — six months before a single Soviet tank crossed the border. Cash, radios, propaganda at first; then, within weeks of the invasion, weapons. America did not take up the mujahideen because the Soviets invaded. The involvement came first. The aim, in Brzezinski's own words, was to bleed Moscow white in the mountains — to hand the USSR "its Vietnam war." A proxy army, built to trap a superpower.

Then the money came, and it did not stop. Twenty to thirty million dollars a year at the start; six hundred and thirty million a year by 1987. Billions before the decade was out — and Saudi Arabia matched Washington dollar for dollar. Six to twelve billion dollars, American and Saudi, to raise an army from nothing.

And the guns came dressed as the enemy's. To keep American fingerprints off them, the weapons had to be Soviet-pattern — and that took a coalition. Israel sold the CIA the Soviet arms it had captured in its wars with the Arabs; Egypt emptied its old Soviet stockpiles into the pipeline; Britain and China added more. A war on the Soviet Union, armed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel alike. This was not a rogue cell or a fringe that grew itself. It was a coalition of states, taking a marginal thing and growing it on purpose.

The cash ran through Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, and the ISI chose who got the guns. It chose the hardest commanders it could find — Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, the most radical in the field, because the most radical fought hardest. The ISI armed and trained more than a hundred thousand fighters, and drew thirty-five to forty thousand foreign volunteers from across the Muslim world into a war that was never theirs.

And they did not only arm it. They taught it. American aid money paid the University of Nebraska to print schoolbooks for Afghan children — millions of them — in which the alphabet ran K is for Kalashnikov, J is for jihad, and children learned to count not with apples but with tanks, with missiles, with dead Russian soldiers. Thirteen million of those books went out. The United States did not borrow the language of holy war. It printed it, bound it, and handed it to children.

Now hold the whole thing still and see what was made. Armed struggle in Islam belongs to a state — to a governing authority with a chain of command and a body that can be called to account. What the CIA and the ISI built was the exact inverse: private fighters, untrained in the law, answerable to no one, handed rifles and told they were mujahideen, told this was a personal duty owed to God. That is the invention. The freelance holy warrior — no state above them, no law around them, no authority but their own grievance — was not revealed in Makkah. That figure was manufactured in Peshawar, on an American budget, as a device to bleed the Soviet Union.

The Soviets left in 1989. The money had not built a country; it had built an idea, and the idea stayed standing after the paymasters went home. The camps stayed. The weapons stayed. The trained fighters stayed. And the idea stayed — that anyone with a gun and a grievance could name themselves a soldier of God, no state required. Washington had feted these fighters as freedom fighters — Reagan hosted their commanders in the Oval Office — and when they turned inconvenient, the label was swapped for terrorist and the builders walked away. Asked, two decades on, whether he regretted arming the fighters who fed al-Qaida, Brzezinski brushed it aside: what mattered more to history, he wanted to know — the fall of the Soviet empire, or "some agitated Muslims"?

And bin Laden? He was inside that world — running the office that funnelled Arab volunteers to the front, his ally Hekmatyar taking CIA money by the crate. Did the Agency cut Osama bin Laden a personal cheque? The historians who have read the files — Steve Coll, Peter Bergen — say no. It does not matter. You do not have to sign someone's cheque to build the world they rise in. America built the machine that trained forty thousand foreign fighters and gave the word jihad its modern meaning — stateless, freelance, aimed at whoever the holder of the gun decided.¹⁰ Al-Qaida is what walked out of that machine.

So the monster is real. It has a maker, and the maker is not the Qur'an. But strip the manufacture away and one question stands where the whole operation was built to keep it buried: by whose authority did any of them fight? Islam has always had an answer. It is the answer that convicts every freelance killer who ever grabbed the word — and, as it turns out, the same answer the West once wrote into its own founding law, and then abandoned.


The Rule America Broke

By whose authority. Put the question to Islamic law, and the law answers without hesitation.

Armed jihad is an act of state. Not a mood, not a private project, not a duty anyone assigns themselves — an act of state: declared by a legitimate authority, fought by a regulated force under a chain of command, bound by rules of conduct, answerable for what it does. The classical jurists did not treat this as a pious preference. Al-Mawardi's eleventh-century manual on Islamic governance — the classic statement of how Muslim rule was ordered — gives the matter an entire chapter: the appointment of the Emir of Jihad. An office. Appointed. In the law of Islam, war is a function of government, alongside the treasury and the courts. Whoever holds a rifle and a grievance holds no more authority to declare jihad than to mint currency.¹¹ The jurists allowed one narrow exception — a people invaded may repel the invader — and even that is a concession to communities under attack, not a licence for anyone on earth to appoint themselves to someone else's war.

Now look at who else wrote that rule. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution: Congress shall have power to declare war. Not the president alone. Not a general. Not an angry believer with a cause. The founders understood what Islam had held from its earliest days, more than a thousand years before them — that killing in a nation's name is too grave to be private, and the decision must belong to the law.

Then ask when America last obeyed it. June 1942. Congress declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania; Roosevelt signed the resolutions; and no Congress has formally declared war since.¹² Not for Korea. Not for Vietnam. Not for Afghanistan. Not for Iraq — the war that filled the word jihad with two decades of blood. For more than eighty years the United States has fought its wars on every authority except the one its own founding law names.

Sit with the shape of that. The civilisation lecturing Muslims about lawless holy war walked away from its own law of war in 1942. The religion being lectured still binds its believers to the rule America broke: no war without the state, no authority without account. On this point Islam is not looser than the US Constitution. It is the Constitution — still in force.

I did not get this from a book. I got it across a table from men who wanted me to break it.

Years into my life as a Muslim, members of a group I belonged to in Houston decided that armed jihad was their personal duty — that the war in Iraq was a summons addressed to them individually, and that God required them to answer it. In time, some of them began working out how to get there. Long before I ever wore a wire, I argued the law of this section to their faces. We do have a religious duty to help the people of war-torn countries — I agreed with them there, and said so. But vigilante justice through violent jihad is forbidden in Islam. The concept of jihad is no different from how America's own military is constitutionally established. A legitimate Islamic army, for over 1,400 years, was always accompanied by a well-regulated military, controlled by a diplomatic apparatus — and vigilante hordes of ad hoc wannabe soldiers, forming their own groups and claiming religious legitimacy, are a danger to Muslims, to Islam, and to the world.¹³

They heard the law. They decided it did not apply to them. So I went to the FBI, and then I went back into those meetings as a civilian undercover operative, wearing a wire, and recorded them planning their private war. The press would come to call them the "Houston Taliban." The case ended where the rule says every private war ends — in a courtroom, with convictions. Not one of them ever fought under a flag. Not one of them ever held an authority beyond their own anger.

And that is the pivot on which the last of the lie breaks. If armed jihad belongs to the state, then the freelance killer is not a soldier who answers to a different flag. The word for what they are is not mujahid (defender of the faith), and it is not martyr. Islamic law named what they are fourteen centuries ago — and that name is the next thing the fearmonger never reads to you.


Criminals, Not Martyrs

Start with how a lawful armed jihad is fought, because the rules are older than you think, and the terrorist breaks every one.

In the year 632, the first caliph, Abu Bakr, sent an army north into Syria. Before it marched, he gave its commander ten standing orders. Do not kill a woman, a child, or the aged and infirm. Do not harm the monk in his monastery. Do not cut down a fruit-bearing tree or burn a field. Do not slaughter livestock except for food. Do not raze a home. No treachery. No mutilation. No looting.¹⁴ That is a law of armed conduct, dictated fourteen centuries before the Geneva Conventions, and it reads like their first draft. Rules that precise are not invented on the morning of a march. They are the residue of hard experience — and they did not begin with Abu Bakr. He was carrying forward the Prophet's own instruction on the conduct of war, the standing guidance that years of battle had already fixed.

Now set the terrorist against it. The targets are the market, the mosque, the concert hall, the office tower — women, children, the old, the very people the code shields. No field is spared; the terrorist is the fire. Every line Abu Bakr drew, the terrorist crosses on purpose, because crossing it is the whole method. Whatever this is, it is the exact inverse of the thing Islamic law calls jihad. The Qur'an fixed the boundary in a single clause: fight those who fight you, and do not transgress.¹⁵ This is nothing but transgression.

Then there is the word they die for. Martyr. The belief is that the vest makes a shahid — a martyr — that the act proves itself. It does not. Martyrdom in Islam is not self-awarded, and the tradition saw this coming. The Prophet said the first person brought to judgment on the Last Day will be a man killed in battle who presents himself as a martyr — and God will name him a liar, because he fought to be called brave, not for God; and he will be dragged face-down into the Fire.¹⁶ Whoever slaughters a crowd so that a website will post their picture and call them a martyr has already been answered, fourteen centuries in advance. Not paradise. The Fire, face-down, first in the queue.

So take away the two words they stole. Not a soldier — they answer to no state. Not a martyr — the tradition damns the claim by name. What is left? Islamic law has a word for what is left, and it is not a modern invention.

The Qur'an names a crime: to wage war against God and spread corruption through the land. The jurists called it hiraba — the waging of war against society — and the one who commits it a muharib. Read the classical definition and you are reading a description of terrorism set down a thousand years early — armed bands who fall on the defenceless, make the roads unsafe, kill to spread fear. Every school of Sunni law counts it among the gravest crimes a person can commit and fixes to it the harshest punishment in the code.¹⁷ That is the category the terrorist actually occupies. Not mujahid. Not martyr. Muharib — as near as the seventh century came to the word terrorist. This is not Islamic law bent to a cause. It is the precise crime that law was written to punish.

And the states that built the freelance fighter knew every word of it. None of this is buried; it sits in the first manuals of the faith. They did not recruit jurists. They recruited the young and the unlettered — often unable to read or write, and unschooled in the faith they were told they were dying for — put a rifle in their hands and a slogan in their mouths, and aimed them at an empire, because a fighter who mistook hiraba for jihad was gold. The ignorance was not a by-product of the operation. It was the product.

So the terrorist reads the word backwards, taking the crime for the duty — hiraba for jihad — and dies believing it made them a soldier of God. Now hold that thought, because a second person sells you the very same reading: the influencer, the preacher, the propagandist who points at the wreckage and swears that this is what jihad has always meant. The terrorist believed the lie. This one need not believe a word of it — they only need you to, because the fear pays: subscriptions, books, donations, votes. Both need the same thing from you — that you take the crime for the faith. The first is dead. The second is waving a finger in front of you.


Two People, One Lie

The two have never met. One is dead under rubble they made. The other is on a screen, a stage, a pulpit — well-fed, and growing an audience. Put them in a room and each would call the other an enemy. They are running the same operation on you.

Start with what the terrorist needs. They need the world to call the crime jihad. That is the only thing that turns the slaughter into martyrdom, the muharib into a hero, the murder into worship. Strip the word away and the terrorist is what the law says: a criminal who killed the defenceless and broke every rule the faith set down. So the terrorist needs you to believe the lie about the word as badly as they needed the weapon. Without that belief, they died for nothing — and somewhere underneath the certainty, they knew it.

Now the second. This one needs the terrorist — needs the wreckage, the body count, the name in the news, because the wreckage is the product. No atrocity, no threat; no threat, no audience; no audience, no subscriptions, no books, no donations, no votes. The attack they claim to despise is the best thing that happens to their week. They do not have to plant it. They only have to point at it and say the word — this is Islam, this is what it has always meant — and the fear does the rest, and the fear pays.

Look at what they have built between them. The killer commits the crime and calls it the faith. The seller points at the crime and calls it the faith. Sworn enemies both agree, to the letter, on one false claim: that the crime is the faith. Two people who would gladly kill each other, telling you the identical lie, because each needs you to believe it. The terrorist cannot become a martyr without the seller's help. The seller cannot make a living without the terrorist's corpse. They are business partners across a battlefield, and the bill falls on someone who was never part of the deal.

That someone is the Muslim in front of you. The neighbour, the colleague, the child in a classroom — the nearly two billion who had this word lifted out of their mouths and turned into the charge against them before they said a thing. They did not build the monster. Their book did not sanctify it; their law convicts it. They inherited a word that means the struggle to be better, and were handed the bill for a crime committed, funded, and sold by others.

So take the word back. You have it whole now, not as it was handed to you. Jihad is the effort toward the harder, better thing. It is the word of justice spoken to the face of a tyrant who can kill you for it. It is the wealth given away and the self brought to heel. And yes, it is the narrow, lawful, hemmed-in defence of a people under attack — a matter for a state and its law, never for a private grievance and a weapon. That last, freelance thing they taught you to fear was not revealed in Makkah. It was built in Peshawar, on a Cold War budget, and the faith it claims to serve had a name for it long before the crime: not mujahid, not martyr — muharib. Criminal.

So the next time the word is dropped in front of you like a gavel — after the crime, under the headline, from the finger waving in your face — you are no longer the jury they picked. You know what the word means. You know who built the thing they are pointing at. You know who collects on your fear. The case they wanted to close on nearly two billion people does not close, because their one witness has just turned out to be two people telling the same lie.

The word never belonged to them. It belongs to the ones who live it — the believer struggling against their own greed and cowardice, the voice raised against a tyrant, a people defending their homes under the law. Hand it back to them. And read the charge to the ones who put it in your mouth.


Endnotes

¹ On the greatest jihad being a word of justice spoken before a tyrannical ruler: Sunan Abi Dawud 4344; also Jami' al-Tirmidhi 2174 and Sunan Ibn Majah; graded sahih (al-Albani) and hasan by corroboration.

² Council of Clermont, 27 November 1095: Urban II preached an armed pilgrimage to reclaim Jerusalem, promising remission of sins to those who fought and paradise to those who died; the cry "Deus vult" became the Crusades' battle cry. Historians hold that he fused holy war, pilgrimage and penance rather than inventing the idea. On the 1099 sack of Jerusalem: Raymond of Aguilers and the Gesta Francorum.

³ On tawhid: in the strict creedal sense holiness belongs to God alone, so the careful favour "Noble" (al-Karim) or "Glorious" (al-Majid) for the Qur'an. On the terms: harb (war) and qital (fighting), neither sacred; classical law treats war as grave and last-resort, never as worship.

Qur'an 25:52 (al-Furqan), a Makkan verse: "strive against them with it a great striving" (jihadan kabiran) — "with it" glossed by Ibn Abbas and Ibn Kathir to mean the Qur'an itself. The first permission to fight, 22:39, is Madinan — so 25:52 precedes the armed sense.

On striving with one's wealth alongside one's life: the Qur'an repeatedly pairs the two — see 9:20, 9:41, and 61:11 — and 49:15 defines the believers as those who "strive with their wealth and their lives in the cause of God."

Operation Cyclone, the CIA's covert programme to arm the Afghan mujahideen (1979–89), was the longest and most expensive covert operation in the Agency's history. Carter signed the first finding on 3 July 1979 — six months before the Soviet invasion of 24 December 1979 (Robert Gates, From the Shadows). On the "bleeder" strategy — Brzezinski's stated aim of giving the USSR "its Vietnam war" — see his interview in Le Nouvel Observateur, 15–21 January 1998. The interview's further claim that the US deliberately provoked the invasion is contested (cf. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars), but the pre-invasion timing of the aid is documented; the "some agitated Muslims" reply is from the same interview (William Blum's translation of the French).

Funding rose from $20–30 million a year (1980) to $630 million (1987); combined US, Saudi and Chinese aid is estimated at $6–12 billion, with Saudi Arabia matching US funding dollar for dollar. To keep US involvement deniable, the arms were supplied in Soviet pattern: Israel sold the CIA Soviet weapons it had captured in its wars with the Arab states, and Egypt fed its older Soviet-made stock into the pipeline, with Britain (MI6 and the SAS) and China also contributing. (Steve Coll, Ghost Wars; corroborated on the CIA's use of Israeli-captured Soviet arms in Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Afghanistan and the Genesis of Global Jihad," Peace Research 37:1 (2005), 15–30; and standard histories of Operation Cyclone.)

The aid was routed through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which directed the largest share to the most radical commanders, notably Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani; the ISI armed and trained over 100,000 insurgents (1978–92), and an estimated 35,000–40,000 foreign volunteers passed through the training network.

Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, "From U.S., the ABC's of Jihad," Washington Post, 23 March 2002: USAID funded the University of Nebraska–Omaha (roughly $51 million, 1984–94) to produce Dari and Pashto primers filled with jihad and weaponry — children taught to count with tanks, missiles and land mines; over 13 million distributed, later adopted as the Afghan school system's core curriculum. USAID and the university state the violent content was supplied by the mujahideen groups. The same programme and its militarised primers are documented in Hoodbhoy, "Afghanistan and the Genesis of Global Jihad" (2005). The books themselves survive in the University of Nebraska at Omaha's Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection (digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/daripashtobooks) — among them The Alphabet of Jehaad Literacy (1986) and the reader Siwād-i jihādī ("Jihad Literacy," 1987), both published during the occupation by the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen, alongside grade-one primers that teach counting with rifles, grenades and bullets.

¹⁰ On bin Laden: his Maktab al-Khadamat channelled Arab volunteers into the war, and his ally Hekmatyar received direct CIA support via the ISI; the claim that bin Laden was himself a CIA asset is rejected by the historians who have examined the record — Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, and Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., who calls it an axiom advanced with no supporting evidence.

¹¹ Al-Mawardi (d. 1058), al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah (The Ordinances of Government), a foundational classical statement of Sunni governance, organises armed jihad as a function of the ruling authority, devoting its fourth chapter to the appointment of the Emir of Jihad. In classical jurisprudence, offensive jihad is a collective obligation (fard kifaya) discharged under legitimate authority; the defensive case — repelling an invasion of Muslim land — is the narrow exception in which the duty falls on the invaded community directly.

¹² US Constitution, Article I, Section 8. The last formal declarations of war by the United States were passed by Congress on 4 June 1942 and signed by President Roosevelt on 5 June 1942, against Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (US Senate archives; Congressional Research Service, "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force"). Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq were all fought without one.

¹³ The exchange, and the argument as I made it at the time, are recounted in my memoir, God and Country, published under the pen name Will Prentiss.

¹⁴ The ten commands of Abu Bakr to his army bound for Syria (632) are recorded in Malik's Muwatta (Book 21, Kitab al-Jihad) and in al-Tabari's account of the expedition of Usama ibn Zayd: no killing of women, children or the aged; no harming of monks; no felling of fruit-bearing trees or burning of crops; no slaughter of livestock except for food; no destruction of dwellings; no treachery, mutilation or theft from the spoils. They extended the Prophet's own prohibition on the killing of women and children in war (Sahih al-Bukhari 3015; Sahih Muslim 1744).

¹⁵ Qur'an 2:190: "Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not transgress. God does not love the transgressors." From it the classical jurists derived the immunity of non-combatants — women, children, the elderly, clergy, and labourers not engaged in the fighting.

¹⁶ Sahih Muslim 1905 (also numbered Book 20, no. 4688): the Prophet is reported to say that among the first cast into the Fire on the Day of Judgment will be a man killed in battle who fought so that it would be said of him "he is brave" — condemned because he fought for reputation, not for God.

¹⁷ Qur'an 5:33, known to the jurists as "the hiraba verse," condemns those who "wage war against God and His Messenger and strive to spread corruption in the land." Classical jurisprudence across all four Sunni schools built on it the crime of hiraba — armed aggression that terrorises a community — whose perpetrator is the muharib, and attached to it among the severest of the hudud penalties. Modern scholarship treats hiraba as the classical Islamic category corresponding to terrorism.

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